Posts Tagged 'Stephen Moore'

Judy Shelton Speaks Up for the Gold Standard

I have been working on a third installment in my series on how, with a huge assist from Arthur Burns, things fell apart in the 1970s. In my third installment, I will discuss the sad denouement of Burns’s misunderstandings and mistakes when Paul Volcker administered a brutal dose of tight money that caused the worst downturn and highest unemployment since the Great Depression in the Great Recession of 1981-82. But having seen another one of Judy Shelton’s less than enlightening op-eds arguing for a gold standard in the formerly respectable editorial section of the Wall Street Journal, I am going to pause from my account of Volcker’s monetary policy in the early 1980s to give Dr. Shelton my undivided attention.

The opening paragraph of Dr. Shelton’s op-ed is a less than auspicious start.

Since President Trump announced his intention to nominate Herman Cain and Stephen Moore to serve on the Federal Reserve’s board of governors, mainstream commentators have made a point of dismissing anyone sympathetic to a gold standard as crankish or unqualified.

That is a totally false charge. Since Herman Cain and Stephen Moore were nominated, they have been exposed as incompetent and unqualified to serve on the Board of Governors of the world’s most important central bank. It is not support for reestablishing the gold standard that demonstrates their incompetence and lack of qualifications. It is true that most economists, myself included, oppose restoring the gold standard. It is also true that most supporters of the gold standard, like, say — to choose a name more or less at random — Ron Paul, are indeed cranks and unqualified to hold high office, but there is indeed a minority of economists, including some outstanding ones like Larry White, George Selgin, Richard Timberlake and Nobel Laureate Robert Mundell, who do favor restoring the gold standard, at least under certain conditions.

But Cain and Moore are so unqualified and so incompetent, that they are incapable of doing more than mouthing platitudes about how wonderful it would be to have a dollar as good as gold by restoring some unspecified link between the dollar and gold. Because of their manifest ignorance about how a gold standard would work now or how it did work when it was in operation, they were unprepared to defend their support of a gold standard when called upon to do so by inquisitive reporters. So they just lied and denied that they had ever supported returning to the gold standard. Thus, in addition to being ignorant, incompetent and unqualified to serve on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Cain and Moore exposed their own foolishness and stupidity, because it was easy for reporters to dig up multiple statements by both aspiring central bankers explicitly calling for a gold standard to be restored and muddled utterances bearing at least vague resemblance to support for the gold standard.

So Dr. Shelton, in accusing mainstream commentators of dismissing anyone sympathetic to a gold standard as crankish or unqualified is accusing mainstream commentators of a level of intolerance and closed-mindedness for which she supplies not a shred of evidence.

After making a defamatory accusation with no basis in fact, Dr. Shelton turns her attention to a strawman whom she slays mercilessly.

But it is wholly legitimate, and entirely prudent, to question the infallibility of the Federal Reserve in calibrating the money supply to the needs of the economy. No other government institution had more influence over the creation of money and credit in the lead-up to the devastating 2008 global meltdown.

Where to begin? The Federal Reserve has not been targeting the quantity of money in the economy as a policy instrument since the early 1980s when the Fed misguidedly used the quantity of money as its policy target in its anti-inflation strategy. After acknowledging that mistake the Fed has, ever since, eschewed attempts to conduct monetary policy by targeting any monetary aggregate. It is through the independent choices and decisions of individual agents and of many competing private banking institutions, not the dictate of the Federal Reserve, that the quantity of money in the economy at any given time is determined. Indeed, it is true that the Federal Reserve played a great role in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, but its mistake had nothing to do with the amount of money being created. Rather the problem was that the Fed was setting its policy interest rate at too high a level throughout 2008 because of misplaced inflation fears fueled by a temporary increases in commodity prices that deterred the Fed from providing the monetary stimulus needed to counter a rapidly deepening recession.

But guess who was urging the Fed to raise its interest rate in 2008 exactly when a cut in interest rates was what the economy needed? None other than the Wall Street Journal editorial page. And guess who was the lead editorial writer on the Wall Street Journal in 2008 for economic policy? None other than Stephen Moore himself. Isn’t that special?

I will forbear from discussing Dr. Shelton’s comments on the Fed’s policy of paying interest on reserves, because I actually agree with her criticism of the policy. But I do want to say a word about her discussion of currency manipulation and the supposed role of the gold standard in minimizing such currency manipulation.

The classical gold standard established an international benchmark for currency values, consistent with free-trade principles. Today’s arrangements permit governments to manipulate their currencies to gain an export advantage.

Having previously explained to Dr. Shelton that currency manipulation to gain an export advantage depends not just on the exchange rate, but the monetary policy that is associated with that exchange rate, I have to admit some disappointment that my previous efforts to instruct her don’t seem to have improved her understanding of the ABCs of currency manipulation. But I will try again. Let me just quote from my last attempt to educate her.

The key point to keep in mind is that for a country to gain a competitive advantage by lowering its exchange rate, it has to prevent the automatic tendency of international price arbitrage and corresponding flows of money to eliminate competitive advantages arising from movements in exchange rates. If a depreciated exchange rate gives rise to an export surplus, a corresponding inflow of foreign funds to finance the export surplus will eventually either drive the exchange rate back toward its old level, thereby reducing or eliminating the initial depreciation, or, if the lower rate is maintained, the cash inflow will accumulate in reserve holdings of the central bank. Unless the central bank is willing to accept a continuing accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves, the increased domestic demand and monetary expansion associated with the export surplus will lead to a corresponding rise in domestic prices, wages and incomes, thereby reducing or eliminating the competitive advantage created by the depressed exchange rate. Thus, unless the central bank is willing to accumulate foreign-exchange reserves without limit, or can create an increased demand by private banks and the public to hold additional cash, thereby creating a chronic excess demand for money that can be satisfied only by a continuing export surplus, a permanently reduced foreign-exchange rate creates only a transitory competitive advantage.

I don’t say that currency manipulation is not possible. It is not only possible, but we know that currency manipulation has been practiced. But currency manipulation can occur under a fixed-exchange rate regime as well as under flexible exchange-rate regimes, as demonstrated by the conduct of the Bank of France from 1926 to 1935 while it was operating under a gold standard.

Dr. Shelton believes that restoring a gold standard would usher in a period of economic growth like the one that followed World War II under the Bretton Woods System. Well, Dr. Shelton might want to reconsider how well the Bretton Woods system worked to the advantage of the United States.

The fact is that, as Ralph Hawtrey pointed out in his Incomes and Money, the US dollar was overvalued relative to the currencies of most its European trading parties, which is why unemployment in the US was chronically above 5% after 1954 to 1965. With undervalued currencies, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Britain, France and Japan all had much lower unemployment than the US. It was only in 1961, after John Kennedy became President, when the Federal Reserve systematically loosened monetary policy, forcing Germany and other countries to revalue their countries upward to avoid importing US inflation that the US was able redress the overvaluation of the dollar. But in doing so, the US also gradually rendered the $35/ounce price of gold, at which it maintained a kind of semi-convertibility of the dollar, unsustainable, leading a decade later to the final abandonment of the gold-dollar peg.

Dr. Shelton is obviously dedicated to restoring the gold standard, but she really ought to study up on how the gold standard actually worked in its previous incarnations and semi-incarnations, before she opines any further about how it might work in the future. At present, she doesn’t seem to be knowledgeable about how the gold standard worked in the past, and her confidence that it would work well in the future is entirely misplaced.

Krugman on the Volcker Disinflation

Earlier in the week, Paul Krugman wrote about the Volcker disinflation of the 1980s. Krugman’s annoyance at Stephen Moore (whom Krugman flatters by calling him an economist) and John Cochrane (whom Krugman disflatters by comparing him to Stephen Moore) is understandable, but he has less excuse for letting himself get carried away in an outburst of Keynesian triumphalism.

Right-wing economists like Stephen Moore and John Cochrane — it’s becoming ever harder to tell the difference — have some curious beliefs about history. One of those beliefs is that the experience of disinflation in the 1980s was a huge shock to Keynesians, refuting everything they believed. What makes this belief curious is that it’s the exact opposite of the truth. Keynesians came into the Volcker disinflation — yes, it was mainly the Fed’s doing, not Reagan’s — with a standard, indeed textbook, model of what should happen. And events matched their expectations almost precisely.

I’ve been cleaning out my library, and just unearthed my copy of Dornbusch and Fischer’s Macroeconomics, first edition, copyright 1978. Quite a lot of that book was concerned with inflation and disinflation, using an adaptive-expectations Phillips curve — that is, an assumed relationship in which the current inflation rate depends on the unemployment rate and on lagged inflation. Using that approach, they laid out at some length various scenarios for a strategy of reducing the rate of money growth, and hence eventually reducing inflation. Here’s one of their charts, with the top half showing inflation and the bottom half showing unemployment:




Not the cleanest dynamics in the world, but the basic point should be clear: cutting inflation would require a temporary surge in unemployment. Eventually, however, unemployment could come back down to more or less its original level; this temporary surge in unemployment would deliver a permanent reduction in the inflation rate, because it would change expectations.

And here’s what the Volcker disinflation actually looked like:


A temporary but huge surge in unemployment, with inflation coming down to a sustained lower level.

So were Keynesian economists feeling amazed and dismayed by the events of the 1980s? On the contrary, they were feeling pretty smug: disinflation had played out exactly the way the models in their textbooks said it should.

Well, this is true, but only up to a point. What Krugman neglects to mention, which is why the Volcker disinflation is not widely viewed as having enhanced the Keynesian forecasting record, is that most Keynesians had opposed the Reagan tax cuts, and one of their main arguments was that the tax cuts would be inflationary. However, in the Reagan-Volcker combination of loose fiscal policy and tight money, it was tight money that dominated. Score one for the Monetarists. The rapid drop in inflation, though accompanied by high unemployment, was viewed as a vindication of the Monetarist view that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, a view which now seems pretty commonplace, but in the 1970s and 1980s was hotly contested, including by Keynesians.

However, the (Friedmanian) Monetarist view was only partially vindicated, because the Volcker disinflation was achieved by way of high interest rates not by tightly controlling the money supply. As I have written before on this blog (here and here) and in chapter 10 of my book on free banking (especially, pp. 214-21), Volcker actually tried very hard to slow down the rate of growth in the money supply, but the attempt to implement a k-percent rule induced perverse dynamics, creating a precautionary demand for money whenever monetary growth overshot the target range, the anticipation of an imminent future tightening causing people, fearful that cash would soon be unavailable, to hoard cash by liquidating assets before the tightening. The scenario played itself out repeatedly in the 1981-82 period, when the most closely watched economic or financial statistic in the world was the Fed’s weekly report of growth in the money supply, with growth rates over the target range being associated with falling stock and commodities prices. Finally, in the summer of 1982, Volcker announced that the Fed would stop trying to achieve its money growth targets, and the great stock market rally of the 1980s took off, and economic recovery quickly followed.

So neither the old-line Keynesian dismissal of monetary policy as irrelevant to the control of inflation, nor the Monetarist obsession with controlling the monetary aggregates fared very well in the aftermath of the Volcker disinflation. The result was the New Keynesian focus on monetary policy as the key tool for macroeconomic stabilization, except that monetary policy no longer meant controlling a targeted monetary aggregate, but controlling a targeted interest rate (as in the Taylor rule).

But Krugman doesn’t mention any of this, focusing instead on the conflicts among  non-Keynesians.

Indeed, it was the other side of the macro divide that was left scrambling for answers. The models Chicago was promoting in the 1970s, based on the work of Robert Lucas and company, said that unemployment should have come down quickly, as soon as people realized that the Fed really was bringing down inflation.

Lucas came to Chicago in 1975, and he was the wave of the future at Chicago, but it’s not as if Friedman disappeared; after all, he did win the Nobel Prize in 1976. And although Friedman did not explicitly attack Lucas, it’s clear that, to his credit, Friedman never bought into the rational-expectations revolution. So although Friedman may have been surprised at the depth of the 1981-82 recession – in part attributable to the perverse effects of the money-supply targeting he had convinced the Fed to adopt – the adaptive-expectations model in the Dornbusch-Fischer macro textbook is as much Friedmanian as Keynesian. And by the way, Dornbush and Fischer were both at Chicago in the mid 1970s when the first edition of their macro text was written.

By a few years into the 80s it was obvious that those models were unsustainable in the face of the data. But rather than admit that their dismissal of Keynes was premature, most of those guys went into real business cycle theory — basically, denying that the Fed had anything to do with recessions. And from there they just kept digging ever deeper into the rabbit hole.

But anyway, what you need to know is that the 80s were actually a decade of Keynesian analysis triumphant.

I am just as appalled as Krugman by the real-business-cycle episode, but it was as much a rejection of Friedman, and of all other non-Keynesian monetary theory, as of Keynes. So the inspiring morality tale spun by Krugman in which the hardy band of true-blue Keynesians prevail against those nasty new classical barbarians is a bit overdone and vastly oversimplified.


About Me

David Glasner
Washington, DC

I am an economist in the Washington DC area. My research and writing has been mostly on monetary economics and policy and the history of economics. In my book Free Banking and Monetary Reform, I argued for a non-Monetarist non-Keynesian approach to monetary policy, based on a theory of a competitive supply of money. Over the years, I have become increasingly impressed by the similarities between my approach and that of R. G. Hawtrey and hope to bring Hawtrey’s unduly neglected contributions to the attention of a wider audience.

My new book Studies in the History of Monetary Theory: Controversies and Clarifications has been published by Palgrave Macmillan

Follow me on Twitter @david_glasner

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