Do What Is Right Though the World Should Perish

An ancient debate among economists is whether the monetary authority should be subject to and constrained by an explicit operating rule or should be allowed discretion to act as it sees fit.  The debate goes back to the Bullion Debates in Britain after the British government, in the early stages of the Napoleonic Wars, suspended the obligation of the Bank of England to convert their banknotes into gold at the legally prescribed value of the pound.  One side in the debate, the Bullionists, argued that the Bank of England, enjoying special legal privileges that made it the center of the British monetary system, should be bound by a fixed rule, the absolute duty to convert Bank of England notes, on demand, into a fixed quantity of gold.  The other side, the Anti-Bullionists, maintained that there was no need for the Bank of England to be bound by the obligation to convert.

Over 20 years of intermittent exchanges between opponents and supporters of the suspension, producing some of the most important contributions to monetary thought of the nineteenth century, the Bullion Debates led to a general (though not unanimous) acceptance of the need for convertibility into gold as a stabilizing anchor for a money and banking system in which private banks produce a large share of all the money in circulation.  Despite the resumption of convertibility in 1821, Great Britain experienced damaging financial disturbances in 1825 and 1836, leading to the passage of Bank Charter Act in 1844, imposing a fixed limit on the total amount of banknotes issued by the Bank of England and by other private banks, requiring 100% gold cover for any banknotes issued beyond that fixed limit.

Hopes that, by mimicking the fluctuation of a purely gold currency in response to gold inflows and outflows, the reformed monetary system would avoid future crises were soon disappointed, Britain suffering financial crises in 1847, 1857, and 1866.  Each time the government was forced to grant immunity to the directors of the Bank of England for violating the Bank Charter Act and issuing banknotes in excess of the legal maximum in order to calm commercial panics triggered by fears that the Bank of England would be prevented by the Bank Charter Act from satisfying the demand for credit.  Once temporary suspension of the Act was announced, the panic subsided, the knowledge that credit could be obtained if needed sufficing to moderate the precautionary demand for credit.

By the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the Bank of England, the key institution managing what had become an international gold standard, seemed to have figured out how to do its job reasonably well, and the period of 1880 to 1913 is still looked upon as a golden age of economic stability, growth and prosperity.  But the gold standard couldn’t withstand the pressures of World War I, effectively being suspended in substance in almost all countries.  The attempt to recreate the gold standard in the 1920s led to the Great Depression, because the way the gold standard worked before World War I was not well enough understood for the system to be recreated, more or less from scratch, under the new postwar conditions.  Attempting to follow a misguided conception of how a gold standard ought to work, countries, especially France, redesigned their monetary institutions in ways that inordinately increased the total world demand for gold, producing a world-wide deflation that began in the summer of 1929.

The two economists who really understood the nature of the pathology overtaking the international economy in 1929 were Ralph Hawtrey and Gustav Cassel, having warned of just the potential for a deflationary increase in the demand for gold as a consequence of a simultaneous restoration of the gold standard by many countries, but their warnings went largely unheeded.  Instead, the focus of most economists, central bankers, governments, and practitioners of la haute finance, was to preserve the gold standard at all costs, because to tamper with the gold standard was to allow the unbridled exercise of discretion, to make monetary policy unpredictable, to sanction runaway inflation and monetary anarchy.  But runaway inflation was not the danger — in Hawtrey’s immortal analogy to warn of inflation was like crying “fire, fire” in Noah’s flood – it was runaway deflation.  But rules are rules, and one must always follow the rules.  That the rules had been broken, or at least suspended, in the nineteenth century didn’t seem to matter, because as the old maxim teaches, we must do what is right though the world should perish.

The Great Depression came to an end mainly because the rules were not only broken, they were tossed out the window.  The gold standard was junked.  First, Britain gave up in September 1931, and a recovery started within a few months.  The US held out till March 1933, but when Franklin Roosevelt became President, understanding that prices had to rise before a recovery could start, he suspended the gold standard, devalued the dollar, thereby igniting the fastest expansion of industrial output in any 4-month period (57%) in American history while the Dow Jones average nearly doubled.

In our own Little Depression, we have become attached – I would say dysfunctionally attached – to an inflation target of 2% or less.  The inflation target is to the Little Depression what the gold standard was to the Great Depression.  The consequences this time are less horrific than they were last time, but they are plenty bad.  And the justification is equally spurious.  I would not go so far as to say that rules are made to be broken.  Some rules should not be broken under almost any circumstances, and almost any rule may have to be broken under some very extreme circumstances.  But not every rule — certainly not a rule that says that inflation may never exceed 2% — is entitled to such deference.

The European union and the common European currency are now on the verge of disaster because the European Central Bank, dominated by a German aversion to inflation, refused to provide enough monetary expansion to allow the weaker members of the Eurozone to generate enough nominal income to service the interest obligations on their debt.  In the Great Depression, it was Germany that was overindebted and unable to service its obligations.  Attempting to play under the dysfunctional rules of the gold standard, Germany imposed draconian austerity measures in the form of tax increases and public expenditure reductions and wage cuts.  But all such measures were doomed from the start.  All that was accomplished was to pave Hitler’s path to power.  And now, in a historic role reversal, it is Germany that is paving the way for consequences which we may not yet even be able to imagine.  But evidently as long as the European Central Bank can achieve its inflation target, it will be worth it, because, as the old maxim teaches, one must do what is right even if the world should perish.

11 Responses to “Do What Is Right Though the World Should Perish”

  1. 1 Mitch November 4, 2011 at 3:38 pm

    Sir, you are on a roll lately!


  2. 2 Becky Hargrove November 4, 2011 at 4:44 pm

    I read several books on the WWI through Great Depression era , including The Lords of Finance, that left me with more questions than answers. You managed to connect at least a few of the dots for me. It would seem we were caught in the misbegotten lessons of post WWI and still live in the world that line of thought created. One reason for the wrong lessons: the stranglehold France had on Germany at the time, and all anyone afterwards could think of were the perils of hyperinflation, which were many. So apparently, the tool of monetary management was deemed as flawed, before it was even really tried.


  3. 3 Benjamin Cole November 4, 2011 at 5:25 pm

    Perfect blogging. Crickey, is the purpose of macroeconomic policy to obtain prosperity, or to keep a lid on inflation?

    Perhaps some central bankers would prefer the only responsibility to be “keeping a lid on inflation.” It is easy to do, and easily defined. See Japan, or even Volcker. Add in some pompous pettifogging about “inflation is theft” and you have the facade of a monetary policy. The gold nuts like this kind of talk.

    In the real world, people need jobs and profits, encouragement to buy real estate. It is a trickier assignment for a central banker to keep an economy humming towards full capacity. There are potholes, ambushes, unknowns.

    But shirking true duty is not an option.


  4. 4 Joe November 4, 2011 at 6:01 pm


    Didn’t Bagehot briefly argue in Lombard Street that the entire reason Britain had periodical financial crises was because of the existence of the Bank of England. I recall him reccomending the Scottish system and that he noted how Scotland did not experience a banking crisis in 1825. George selgin made a big deal of this in “Central Banks as Sources of Financial Instability”

    Best Wishes!


  5. 5 Lorenzo from Oz November 4, 2011 at 10:26 pm

    I respectfully suggest this somewhat confuses two different questions. One is: should the central bank provide an explicit anchoring of expectations? I would answer firmly, yes. The other is: should the central bank operating according to a binding rule? I would answer firmly, no.

    One explicitly anchors expectations by some target, such as that of the Reserve Bank of Australia:
    The Governor and the Treasurer have agreed that the appropriate target for monetary policy in Australia is to achieve an inflation rate of 2–3 per cent, on average, over the cycle. This is a rate of inflation sufficiently low that it does not materially distort economic decisions in the community. Seeking to achieve this rate, on average, provides discipline for monetary policy decision-making, and serves as an anchor for private-sector inflation expectations. But this is not a rule: the Reserve Bank is free to operate as it sees fit to achieve that target. So, its target is of the form “the Bank will operate in what way it deems appropriate to achieve that target”. Indeed, part of the anchoring of expectations is the credibility the Reserve Bank has that it will operate as required to achieve that target.

    By contrast, the Federal Reserve provides no explicit anchoring of expectations. This seems to me to be the biggest single problem in US monetary policy. (I agree the implicit lowering of the implicit inflation target is also a problem but that it is only implicit is a major problem in itself.)

    A rule is of the form “the Bank will act as the rule determines”. First, that presumes the optimum rule is already known so, in a real sense, retards learning in the system beyond learning how to operate the rule. Second, it can actually result in de-stabilising expectations if circumstances become such that acting as the rule requires will result in sharply diverging results from previous experience. A target can be adaptive in a way that a rule is not.

    So, yes to explicit anchoring of expectations; no to rule-based roboticism in central banking.

    The ECB has a target that does not respond to circumstances while running an “artificial gold standard“: a sort of bastardised roboticism that anchors expectations about price but destabilises expectations about spending (i.e. NGDP) and debt.


  6. 6 Joshua Packwood November 5, 2011 at 2:04 pm

    The irony of Europe looking to China to “finance” itself when it has its own printing press will be blogged about 50 years from now–or the furture’s equivalent.


  7. 7 David Glasner November 5, 2011 at 6:22 pm

    Mitch, Thanks.

    Becky, I’m not sure how to explain what happened in terms of the larger scheme of things, but people were just not working with the right economic and monetary theories. Unfortunately, we still don’t seem to have gotten it right.

    Benjamin, I think that there is some truth in the old saying that the job of the central bank is to lean against the wind. But in the current situation, policy is dominated by the notion that the central bank must never under any circumstances aim at a rate of inflation higher than 2 percent. That idea is a disaster.

    Joe, Bagehot actually did support free banking, but believed that it was not politically realistic given the historical development of banking in Britain. But, without bothering to check, I think that you may be overstating his position somewhat.

    Lorenzo, I think that you have summed it up really well, and I think that we are in almost totally agreement.

    Joshua, You are so right. They will be writing about this for a long, long time.


  8. 8 Marcus Nunes November 6, 2011 at 5:47 am

    Even worse, they´ve also asked Brazil to “pitch in”. They´re acting just like a street corner vagabond, asking for some change to any and all passer-bye!


  9. 9 Lorenzo from Oz November 8, 2011 at 2:26 am

    Thank you, your comment is very reassuring. I have been giving these issues some thought: my comment above came out of writing this post.


  10. 10 David Glasner November 9, 2011 at 10:33 pm

    Lorenzo, Glad to be of service.


  1. 1 Skepticlawyer » On the stupidity of (some) Central Banks – Guest post by Lorenzo Trackback on November 7, 2011 at 3:47 pm

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

About Me

David Glasner
Washington, DC

I am an economist in the Washington DC area. My research and writing has been mostly on monetary economics and policy and the history of economics. In my book Free Banking and Monetary Reform, I argued for a non-Monetarist non-Keynesian approach to monetary policy, based on a theory of a competitive supply of money. Over the years, I have become increasingly impressed by the similarities between my approach and that of R. G. Hawtrey and hope to bring Hawtrey’s unduly neglected contributions to the attention of a wider audience.

My new book Studies in the History of Monetary Theory: Controversies and Clarifications has been published by Palgrave Macmillan

Follow me on Twitter @david_glasner


Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 3,244 other subscribers
Follow Uneasy Money on

%d bloggers like this: